On 12 June 2026, Judge Beryl A. Howell of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a post-judgment discovery order in Blasket Renewable Investments, LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, a long-running enforcement proceeding arising from an ICSID award against Spain. The decision matters because it confirms both the breadth and the limits of post-judgment discovery against a foreign sovereign: judgment creditors may seek sweeping discovery to locate attachable assets, but discovery that treats separate state-linked entities as the sovereign itself, or probes sensitive military-defense arrangements, may be deferred absent a stronger showing.[1]
I. Facts
The underlying dispute began when renewable-energy investors from the Netherlands and Luxembourg initiated arbitration against Spain, alleging that Spain withdrew renewable-energy incentives in violation of the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”).[2] In January 2020, an ICSID tribunal awarded the investors EUR 77 million in damages, pre- and post-award interest, and arbitration costs.[3]
The investors then sought confirmation and enforcement in the District of Columbia because the United States is a party to the ICSID Convention, which requires contracting states to enforce ICSID awards subject to narrow exceptions.[4] While the U.S. enforcement case was pending, the investors assigned their rights in the award and litigation to Blasket Renewable Investments, LLC.[5]
In September 2025, the court confirmed the ICSID award and entered judgment for Blasket, including EUR 77 million in damages, compounded interest, and EUR 2,515,291.69 in arbitration costs.[6] Spain appealed, maintaining that European Union law prevented payment of the award unless approved by the European Commission.[7]
Because Spain had not paid the judgment or posted a supersedeas bond, Blasket pursued post-judgment discovery to identify Spanish assets that could be attached and executed upon.[8] The immediate disputes concerned two categories of discovery: first, whether two Spanish entities, the Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (“SEPI”) and Instituto Cervantes, should be treated as part of Spain for discovery purposes and second, whether subpoenas to Raytheon and Palantir seeking information connected to Spanish defense systems should be quashed.[9]
II. Issues
The court faced two legal questions. First, could Blasket include SEPI and Instituto Cervantes in the definition of “Spain” so that those entities would have to produce documents as if they were the judgment debtor itself?[10] Second, should subpoenas to Raytheon and Palantir proceed where they sought information about Spanish defense systems and military-related technology, notwithstanding Spain’s objections based on sovereign interests, comity, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)?[11]
III. Rule and Holding
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(2) provides that, “[i]n aid of the judgment or execution,” a judgment creditor may obtain discovery from “any person-including the judgment debtor” under the federal rules or applicable state procedure.[12] The Supreme Court has described post-judgment discovery as “quite permissive,” and has held that the FSIA does not itself forbid discovery in aid of execution against a foreign sovereign’s assets.[13]
But foreign sovereigns remain entitled to comity,[14] and courts must consider sovereign interests when managing discovery.[15] The FSIA also protects certain military property from attachment and execution, including property used or intended for military activity that is military in character or controlled by a military authority or defense agency.[16]
The court held that SEPI and Instituto Cervantes could not, at this stage, be treated as Spain itself for direct party discovery. Spain’s objection was sustained without prejudice, leaving Blasket free to obtain discovery from Spain about those entities and to seek an alter-ego finding later if the record supports it.[17]
The court also granted Spain’s motion to quash the Raytheon and Palantir subpoenas without prejudice. The court did not decide whether the requested information would ultimately be discoverable or whether the assets implicated would be immune from attachment. Instead, it prioritized less sensitive asset discovery before permitting discovery into defense-related systems and sovereign security interests.[18]
IV. Reasoning and Disposition
The court began from the broad premise that post-judgment discovery is available against foreign sovereign judgment debtors, but it separated two questions that Blasket’s discovery theory tended to merge: discovery about state-linked entities, and direct discovery from those entities as if they were the sovereign judgment debtor.[19]
On SEPI and Instituto Cervantes, the court emphasized that both sides agreed the entities were juridically separate from Spain. A “separate juridical entity” means an entity legally distinct from the state that owns or created it.[20] Spain had agreed to produce information within its possession, custody, or control concerning its relationship with those entities, including contracts, memoranda of understanding, financial agreements, and payments between Spain and the entities.[21]
The court accepted that Blasket could obtain discovery from Spain “regarding,” “concerning,” and “about” SEPI and Instituto Cervantes, especially if they might hold assets beneficially owned by Spain.[22] But the court rejected the immediate step of compelling SEPI and Instituto Cervantes themselves to respond as though they were Spain. Because ordinary discovery rules distinguish between party discovery and third-party subpoenas, Blasket had to show that the entities were either alter egos of Spain or under Spain’s control such that their documents were effectively in Spain’s custody.[23] An “alter ego” is an entity so controlled by another that the law may treat the two as one for a particular purpose.[24]
The court found the record insufficient for that determination. It therefore sustained Spain’s objection without prejudice. Blasket may still pursue broad discovery from Spain about the entities, and after that discovery may move to compel if it can show that SEPI or Instituto Cervantes is Spain’s alter ego or otherwise subject to Spain’s legal control.[25]
On Raytheon and Palantir, the court recognized that the subpoenas sought information tied to military systems: Raytheon materials concerning PATRIOT air and missile defense systems in Spain, and Palantir materials concerning an intelligence-fusion and analysis solution within Spain’s Armed Forces Intelligence System.[26] Spain argued that the subpoenas targeted military and national-security information and would lead only to assets immune under the FSIA.[27]
The court did not adopt Spain’s broad position that any information touching potentially immune assets is categorically undiscoverable. Indeed, the Supreme Court in NML Capital rejected the argument that a creditor has “no business” seeking discovery about property it may not ultimately execute upon.[28] But the court held that sequencing mattered. The Raytheon and Palantir subpoenas “unabashedly” sought sensitive, sovereign-specific defense information, and comity justified requiring Blasket to pursue less sensitive assets first.[29]
The disposition was therefore twofold: Spain’s objection to treating SEPI and Instituto Cervantes as Spain for discovery purposes was sustained without prejudice, and Spain’s motion to quash the Raytheon and Palantir subpoenas was granted without prejudice.[30]
V. Conclusion
The decision is relevant because it offers a practical roadmap for enforcing investor-state awards against sovereigns in U.S. courts. It confirms that judgment creditors may use broad post-judgment discovery to pursue sovereign assets, including discovery about state-linked entities and potentially attachable property. At the same time, it shows that courts will police the boundary between the sovereign and legally distinct state instrumentalities, and will sequence discovery to avoid premature intrusion into sensitive military or national-security matters. For award creditors, the message is evident: build the evidentiary record on control, custody, beneficial ownership, and alter ego before demanding that state-linked entities produce as the sovereign itself. For sovereign debtors, the ruling shows that comity remains a meaningful case-management tool, but not a blanket shield against asset discovery.[31]
[1] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 13, 15-16 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[2] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 1-2 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[3] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 3 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[4] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 2-3 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[5] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 1, 3 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[6] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 3 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[7] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 3-4 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[8] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 1, 4 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[9] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 2, 9 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[10] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 10-11, 16-17 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[11] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 9, 14 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[12] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(2).
[13] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 13 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[14] First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626-627 (1983).
[15] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 9-10 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[16] Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2).
[17] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 13, 16 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[18] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 15-16 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[19] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 10-11, 13, fn. 2 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[20] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 11 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[21] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 10-11, 16, fn. 2 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[22] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 12-13, fn. 2 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[23] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 10-11, 13 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[24] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 11, 13 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[25] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 12-13, 16 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[26] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 9, 14 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[27] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 14 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[28] Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 144-145 (2014).
[29] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 14-16 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[30] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 15-17 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).
[31] Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 20-1081 (BAH), at 9, 12-13, 15-16 (D.D.C. June 12, 2026).