A standing investment court is a permanent tribunal currently being conceived by States to decide investor-State disputes. Its members would be appointed in advance, and cases would be assigned to them from a fixed bench. The concern is that this could concentrate decision-making power in a small group of State-appointed judges while reducing the parties’ role in choosing who decides their dispute.
A. Introduction
The debate over a standing investment court is no longer abstract. In March 2026, UNCITRAL Working Group III considered separate draft statutes for a permanent first-instance tribunal and a permanent appellate tribunal, together with a paper on the structure and design of a standing mechanism. The details remain under negotiation, but the basic choice is clear: retain case-by-case tribunals or move toward a permanent bench appointed in advance by participating States.[1]
The case for a court deserves to be taken seriously. Supporters argue that permanent judges would be less exposed to repeat-player incentives, random allocation would reduce strategic appointments, an appellate tier would improve consistency and correct legal error, and a permanent registry would strengthen transparency and institutional memory. Those are legitimate objectives.
Investment arbitration has often been criticised for repeat appointments, limited diversity, inconsistent decisions, cost, delay, double-hatting and uncertain ethical standards. Empirical work supports some of those concerns, while cautioning that not every criticism has been proved or traced to party appointment or ad hoc adjudication.[2]
The right question, then, is not whether ISDS should change. The question is comparative: does a standing investment court solve the identified problems better than targeted reform, and are the new concentrations of power, cost and institutional dependence justified by the benefits?
B. What Would a Standing Investment Court Change?
Under the conventional model, a treaty contains the host State’s offer to arbitrate. When an investor accepts that offer by bringing a claim, a tribunal is constituted for that dispute. In a typical three-member tribunal, each side appoints one arbitrator, and the presiding arbitrator is selected jointly, by the co-arbitrators or by an appointing authority. The tribunal ends when the case and any permitted post-award procedures are complete.
A standing mechanism reverses the sequence. Participating States establish the institution and select its members before disputes arise. Cases are then assigned from that bench, ordinarily without either disputing party choosing the judges who will hear the case. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union and its Member States (“CETA”) illustrates the model: it establishes a standing Tribunal whose cases are heard by three-member divisions selected on a rotation, as well as an Appellate Tribunal, although those provisions are not yet in force pending completion of ratification and CETA’s full entry into force.[3]
That is more than a change of label from arbitrator to judge. It changes who controls entry to the adjudicative body, how widely decision-making power is distributed and how easily an interpretative mistake can be corrected.
C. Who Chooses the Judges?
The main concern is appointment asymmetry. In an ordinary inter-State court, the States that appoint the judges are also the only possible litigants. Investor-State adjudication is different. The State normally appears as respondent to a claim brought by an investor alleging breach of treaty protection. Under a standing court, the class of parties that ordinarily appear as respondent would collectively control the upstream selection of the bench, while investors would have no equivalent role.
This advance appointment reduces the risk that a government will choose a decision-maker for one known case. It does not remove the broader incentive to prefer candidates with particular views on fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, damages, shareholder claims, regulatory powers or jurisdiction. Gary Born has described this risk as a form of court-packing. The phrase is deliberately provocative, but the institutional point is straightforward: governments know the limited field in which the judges’ interpretative views will matter.[4]
D. Schwebel: Appointment Power Is Being Reallocated, Not Removed
Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, former President of the International Court of Justice, raised the structural objection directly when criticising the European Commission’s investment court proposals. According to him, in investor-State arbitration, appointment power is shared between the disputing parties. A standing court would transfer that power to States. Individual judges may act with complete independence, yet investors may still question a system in which the respondent class determines who may sit in judgment.[5]
Schwebel also challenged the proportionality of the proposed response. Repeated appointments, inconsistent awards and ethical concerns may justify reform, but they do not by themselves prove the need for exclusive State appointments, permanent tenure and appellate review. The institutional replacement should be linked to defects that the existing structure actually causes.[6]
Random case allocation is an important safeguard, but it operates downstream. It prevents parties from choosing a particular member for a particular dispute; it does not change who chooses the roster. Fernando Dias Simões therefore describes States as the gatekeepers of the court’s composition.[7]
E. Independence Depends on Institutional Design
In Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights did not find that the Court of Arbitration for Sport lacked independence merely because sports bodies influenced its list of arbitrators. The dissent, however, said that independence could still appear compromised when organisations likely to be involved in cases had significant influence over who could be appointed.[8]
Ali Riza and Others v. Turkey went further. The Court examined the Turkish Football Federation Arbitration Committee as an institution: appointment, tenure, remuneration, conflicts rules, administrative support and the balance of influence within the Federation.[9] It found serious structural problems and required reform. In January 2026, Yokuşlu v. Türkiye confirmed that changing the rules on paper is not enough: the system must also be genuinely independent in practice.[10]
These cases do not establish that a State-appointed investment court would breach Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), nor are States equivalent to sports federations. Their relevance is narrower. They show why declarations of independence and random allocation cannot be assessed in isolation from nomination, tenure, reappointment, remuneration, removal and administrative control.
F. Political Safeguards Reduce Risk, but Do Not Eliminate Selection Politics
International judicial appointments inevitably involve politics. Nationality, regional balance, diplomatic relationships, reciprocal support and assessments of a candidate’s outlook may influence nominations. Transparent vacancies, public interviews and independent screening can improve the process. But screening creates its own gatekeeper: someone must appoint the screeners and define the criteria by which candidates are accepted or excluded.[11]
Eligibility rules may also shape the bench before any case is filed. Criteria centred on government, judicial or foreign-service experience can favour candidates already connected to public institutions and disadvantage younger practitioners, private-sector specialists or academics from less represented jurisdictions.[12]
G. Would a Permanent Bench Reduce Concentration?
Investment arbitration also has a genuine concentration problem. Empirical work identifies repeated appointments and deficits in gender, nationality and professional-background diversity, as well as limited opportunities for new entrants.[13] A standing court could arguably improve some forms of diversity if States deliberately built a balanced bench. But it would address concentration by making a limited number of repeated decision-makers a permanent feature of the institution.
In arbitration, an influential arbitrator’s position remains contestable: parties and institutions can stop appointing someone who is unavailable, inefficient or unpersuasive, and new candidates can enter through future appointments. A permanent court creates legal scarcity. Once the bench is filled, new entrants generally wait for a term to end, a resignation or an expansion of the court.
The concentration would also extend beyond the visible bench. A permanent registry develops institutional practices, drafting conventions and accumulated influence.
An appellate tier concentrates authority further because first-instance judges, counsel and treaty parties will organise their conduct around its decisions. Institutional memory is a benefit, but it is also a form of power.
H. What Is Lost When Parties Cannot Appoint?
Party appointments are often described as a source of perceived bias. That criticism has force: arbitrators are not party representatives, and no appointment system should reward partisanship. But party participation also serves as a legitimacy function. Each side can choose one independent decision-maker it considers competent and trustworthy, while the chair is selected through a balancing process.
That participation matters in investor-State disputes because the parties occupy different institutional positions. The State exercises sovereign authority and may control regulators, courts or public bodies involved in the underlying events. The investor seeks an external standard of protection. Allowing both sides to play an equal role in constituting the tribunal can increase acceptance of an adverse result without entitling either side to a favourable decision.
The International Bar Association has identified loss of confidence from removing party appointments as a principal disadvantage of a standing court.[14] The 2020 QMUL-CCIAG survey, which surveyed investors and therefore reflects only one stakeholder group, reached a similar result: 56% of respondents said a system of permanent adjudicators nominated by States would damage confidence in ISDS.[15]
A court could preserve challenge rights, publish judicial profiles or consult parties on candidates. Those measures help, but they are not equivalent to appointing power.
I. A Fixed Bench Also Narrows Professional Access
First appointments often depend on professional networks, institutional visibility and experience gained as counsel, as an academic or as a tribunal secretary. Those barriers should be reduced, not moved to an earlier and more political stage.
A permanent court would make entry periodic. Candidates would first need government nomination or support; after the bench was filled, lawyers who developed relevant expertise later might wait years for another opportunity. Even a demographically diverse first bench would represent a snapshot selected at one institutional moment.
Recent SCC data show that a decentralised appointment system can be improved without closing the field. In SCC cases from 2020 to 2024, women accounted for 51% of appointments made by the SCC itself, and only 4% of arbitrators received ten or more appointments. Those figures do not prove that arbitration is diverse enough. They show that institutions can broaden appointments while retaining a renewable pool.[16]
Professional diversity matters as well. Former government lawyers, diplomats, academics and judges bring valuable experience, but investment cases also turn on project finance, valuation, construction, energy, mining, taxation, telecommunications and other specialised fields. A court could thus become demographically diverse while remaining professionally homogeneous.
J. Would a Court Be Easier or Cheaper for Investors?
A permanent court is sometimes assumed to be more accessible because it is a public institution. That does not follow automatically. In complex investment disputes, much of the cost comes from counsel, experts, document production, translation, hearings and damages evidence. A permanent bench does not remove those costs, and an appellate stage can add another substantial layer.
The Court of Justice of the European Union treated financial accessibility as a serious issue in Opinion 1/17 on CETA. In finding the proposed system compatible with EU law, it relied in part on commitments aimed at improving access for natural persons and small and medium-sized enterprises.[17] The Court’s reliance on those commitments reinforces the point: affordability depends on procedural design and funding choices, not on permanence alone.
A court also has fixed costs. Judicial salaries or retainers, registry staff, technology, facilities, translation and appellate administration continue whether the caseload is heavy or light. The financing problem can be managed, but not eliminated.[18]
K. A Fixed Roster Sacrifices Some Case-Specific Expertise
Investment disputes are not a single category of public law cases. A banking dispute may turn on prudential regulation and resolution. An energy case may depend on tariff methodology and project finance. Mining, construction, telecommunications and tax disputes raise different technical and legal questions.
Party appointments allow a tribunal to be built around the dispute. The parties can consider language, industry knowledge, regional experience, domestic law, treaty expertise, availability and case-management ability. A fixed roster cannot reproduce that flexibility across every sector, legal system and language without becoming very large. Specialist chambers or assignment criteria can help, but extensive tailoring also reduces the neutrality claimed for random allocation.[19]
Generalist judges can decide technical cases with expert assistance, as domestic courts do. The comparative question is whether the existing ability to select relevant expertise should be given up. Investors surveyed by QMUL-CCIAG placed value on sectoral, geographic and subject-matter experience in appointments. Again, that evidence reflects one side of the system, but the interest itself is legitimate.[20]
L. Consistency Is Valuable, but It Is Not the Same as Uniformity
The strongest argument for a standing investment court is consistency. Contradictory decisions under materially identical treaty wording and facts can undermine predictability and confidence. An appellate body can reduce that problem.
But international investment law is not one code. It consists of thousands of treaties concluded at different times with different definitions, exceptions, annexes and standards. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, each instrument must be interpreted according to its own text, context, object and purpose, together with relevant subsequent agreement and practice.[21]
Different results may therefore be correct. A most-favoured-nation clause that expressly excludes dispute settlement is not the same as a broadly worded clause that does not. Treaties differ on legitimate expectations, expropriation, taxation, denial of benefits, shareholder claims and the right to regulate. Scholarship on ISDS inconsistency likewise distinguishes genuine contradiction from differences produced by treaty wording, facts, procedure and applicable law.[22]
That distinction is relevant. Consistency means treating materially similar instruments and facts similarly. Uniformity means applying the same doctrine despite relevant differences. A permanent appellate body would face pressure to create system-wide rules even though it would not be interpreting a single substantive code. Clearer treaty drafting and binding interpretations by the relevant treaty parties are often a more legitimate route to consistency.
M. A Hierarchy Can Also Entrench Error
Consistency is not the same as correctness. In a decentralised system, a mistaken award binds the disputing parties but does not formally control later tribunals. Later tribunals can reject it, distinguish it or expose weaknesses through competing reasoning.
A hierarchy changes the cost of correction. First-instance judges will normally follow appellate rulings; counsel will organise submissions around established doctrines; and a permanent registry will build procedures around accumulated case law. Appellate review can correct serious errors, but an incorrect appellate rule can also spread across many later disputes. The trade-off is between horizontal inconsistency and the possibility of vertically entrenched error.[23] That risk is especially important where the substantive law remains politically contested.
Repeated appellate rulings on legitimate expectations, damages or shareholder claims could become functionally authoritative before States had agreed on a common substantive rule.
N. Appeal Improves Review, but Adds Cost and Delay
Appeal has an obvious attraction. Arbitral tribunals can make mistakes, while annulment and set-aside procedures are deliberately narrow. A well-designed appellate mechanism may improve both accuracy and coherence.
The price is another stage of litigation. CETA, for example, permits review for errors of law, manifest errors in the appreciation of facts and grounds corresponding to ICSID annulment, and allows the appellate tribunal to uphold, modify or reverse the first-instance decision.[24] Depending on the standard of review, an appeal may require further written and oral advocacy, translations, security arrangements, expert work or a remand.
Appeals can also become routine. A government facing a large damages award may find it politically difficult not to exhaust every avenue; investors have the same incentive after dismissal or an unexpectedly low award. In the QMUL-CCIAG survey, views on an appellate mechanism were evenly divided, while 89% opposed a rehearing of both factual and legal findings.[25]
This argues for separating two questions that are often bundled together. A narrow review mechanism may be defensible even if a permanent first-instance court is not. Reformers do not need to replace the entire tribunal-selection model in order to create a limited route for correcting serious legal errors.
O. Permanence Creates Different Political Dependencies
Permanent offices remove some incentives and create others. An arbitrator may be criticised for considering future appointments. A permanent judge may instead be affected, consciously or otherwise, by reappointment, promotion to an appellate tier, institutional reputation or the expectations of nominating governments. Non-renewable terms reduce the reappointment problem but make the original appointment more consequential.
Funding creates another relationship. A court dependent on annual State contributions may face budgetary pressure; one dependent mainly on case fees may face different incentives. Good institutional design can reduce these risks, but no funding model is entirely neutral.
A standing body can also be paralysed at the appointment stage. The WTO Appellate Body remains unable to review appeals because vacancies have not been filled; the term of its last sitting member expired on 30 November 2020.[26] That experience does not predict the fate of an investment court. It shows only that permanence does not guarantee continuity. Holdover rules, alternative appointment procedures and quorum safeguards would need to be designed with political deadlock in mind.
P. Enforcement and Transition Remain Complex
Investment arbitration already operates within established enforcement regimes. ICSID awards benefit from Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention. Non-ICSID awards may generally seek recognition under the New York Convention, subject to its conditions and defences. Neither regime eliminates sovereign immunity from execution, but both provide familiar legal frameworks.[27]
A judgment of a new international court is not automatically an ICSID or New York Convention award. The constitutive treaty must define its legal character, finality and enforcement route. The problem becomes particularly technical if an external appellate tribunal reviews an ICSID award because Article 53 states that an ICSID award is not subject to appeal or another remedy except those provided by the Convention. ICSID has issued an updated note on the possibility of inter se modification among participating States, confirming that the legal bridge requires careful design.[28]
For many years, any multilateral investment court would also coexist with conventional arbitration, bilateral investment court systems, treaties outside the mechanism, domestic courts and State-to-State procedures. Some States may accept a first-instance tribunal, an appellate tribunal, both or neither. The transition may therefore create more fragmentation before it creates less.
Q. Transparency and Ethics Do Not Require a Court
Additionally, many of the strongest criticisms of investment arbitration can be addressed directly. The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency already support publication of key documents, open hearings and third-party submissions, subject to protection for confidential information. Treaties and arbitral rules can also require disclosure of third-party funding and publication of awards.[29]
Ethics can likewise be regulated without abolishing party appointments. UNCITRAL’s Code of Conduct for Arbitrators, prepared with ICSID, addresses independence, impartiality, integrity, efficiency, double-hatting, disclosure, fees and tribunal assistants.[30] The existence of a separate Code for Judges also underlines the broader point: changing the title of the decision-maker does not remove the need for detailed safeguards.
R. A Proportionate Reform Agenda
A stronger reform programme would target each defect at its source rather than assume that all problems have one institutional cause. Some of the possible reforms include the following:
- Make appointments more transparent and broader. Institutions should publish data on gender, nationality, professional background, first appointments and repeat appointments, and should deliberately widen their candidate pools.
- Retain party appointment but regulate it more tightly. The same standards of independence and impartiality should apply to every tribunal member.
- Restrict double-hatting consistently. Parties should know when an arbitrator may also act as counsel or expert in another investment dispute, particularly where the matters are related.
- Enforce procedural efficiency. Tribunals should set realistic but firm timetables, identify potentially dispositive issues early, control document production and avoid bifurcation unless it is likely to dispose of or materially narrow the dispute. Smaller claims can use sole arbitrators or expedited procedures.
- Draft clearer treaties. States can define protected investments, fair and equitable treatment, shareholder claims, investor misconduct, limitation periods, most-favoured-nation treatment and the right to regulate. Clear law is a more legitimate source of consistency than judicial harmonisation across different texts.
- If States consider appellate review indispensable, keep it narrow. A review mechanism should replace rather than duplicate existing remedies, use strict time limits, avoid broad factual rehearing and include safeguards against routine delaying appeals.
These reforms preserve the main advantages of arbitration – equal participation, case-specific expertise, a renewable decision-making pool and established enforcement, while addressing transparency, ethics, diversity, efficiency and serious legal error more directly.
S. Conclusion
The case against a standing investment court is not that courts are inherently less independent than arbitral tribunals, or that investor-State arbitration should remain unchanged. It is that institutional reform should be judged by what it actually changes.
A permanent court would remove party appointments but give States collective control over entry to the bench. It could improve demographic balance, but close adjudicative opportunities for long periods. It could increase consistency but also make an erroneous interpretation more difficult to dislodge. Appeal could correct mistakes, but add another layer of cost and delay. Permanence could strengthen institutional memory, but also concentrate the consequences of political deadlock, funding pressure or poor appointments.
Those trade-offs may ultimately be judged worthwhile. But they should not be accepted by describing the reform as a move from private arbitration to public justice. A permanent court should not be adopted simply because arbitration has flaws; it should be adopted only if it can be shown to produce a fairer, more accessible and more resilient system without creating greater problems of its own. On the present evidence, that case has not yet been made.
[1] UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Draft Statute of a Permanent Tribunal for International Investment Disputes, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.259 (2025); UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Draft Statute of a Permanent Appellate Tribunal for International Investment Disputes, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.260 (2025); UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Structure and Design of a Standing Mechanism for the Resolution of International Investment Disputes, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.256 (2025); see also UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Fifty-Fourth Session (Vienna, 23–27 March 2026), UN Doc. A/CN.9/1240 (2026).
[2] D. Behn, M. Langford and L. Létourneau-Tremblay, Empirical Perspectives on Investment Arbitration: What Do We Know? Does It Matter?, 21 Journal of World Investment & Trade 188, pp. 188-250 (2020).
[3] Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union and Its Member States, of the Other Part (CETA), signed 30 October 2016, OJ L 11/23, 14 January 2017, Arts. 8.27-8.29; Council Decision (EU) 2017/38 of 28 October 2016 on the provisional application of CETA, Art. 1(1)(a). Section F of Chapter Eight, including the investment tribunal and appellate tribunal provisions, is not provisionally applied and will operate upon CETA’s full entry into force.
[4] G. Born, ‘Court-Packing’ and Proposals for an EU Multilateral Investment Court, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 25 October 2021 (last accessed 22 July 2026).
[5] S. Schwebel, The Outlook for the Continued Vitality, or Lack Thereof, of Investor-State Arbitration, 32 Arbitration International 1, pp. 1-15 (2016) (based on keynote remarks delivered at the Fordham Conference on International Arbitration, 4 November 2015).
[6] S. Schwebel, The Proposals of the European Commission for Investment Protection and an Investment Court System, remarks at Sidley Austin, Washington, D.C., 17 May 2016; Schwebel, The Outlook for the Continued Vitality, or Lack Thereof, of Investor-State Arbitration, pp. 1-15.
[7] F. Simoes, UNCITRAL Working Group III: Would an Investment Court De-politicize ISDS?, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 25 March 2020 (last accessed 22 July 2026).
[8] Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, European Court of Human Rights, Applications Nos. 40575/10 and 67474/10, Judgment, 2 October 2018, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Keller and Serghides, paras. 5-17.
[9] Ali Riza and Others v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, Applications Nos. 30226/10, 17880/11, 17887/11, 17891/11 and 5506/16, Judgment, 28 January 2020, paras. 210-222 and 241-242.
[10] Yokuşlu v. Türkiye, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 489/24, Judgment, 6 January 2026, paras. 41-53.
[11] F. Simoes, UNCITRAL Working Group III: Would an Investment Court De-politicize ISDS?
[12] O. Samanci and S. Lakhter, The Unilateral Appointment of Adjudicators to a Multilateral Investment Court: A Failed Attempt to Enhance the Legitimacy of the System?, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 24 February 2025.
[13] A. Bjorklund et al., The Diversity Deficit in International Investment Arbitration, 21 Journal of World Investment & Trade 410, pp. 410-440 (2020).
[14] International Bar Association, Consistency, Efficiency and Transparency in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Chapter 1: Consistency in Investor-State Arbitration (November 2018), p. 33.
[15] Queen Mary University of London and Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group, 2020 QMUL-CCIAG Survey: Investors’ Perceptions of ISDS, pp. 16-17 (May 2020).
[16] J. Lowther and Y. Brunstorp, SCC Report on Arbitrator Appointments in SCC Cases 2020-2024, SCC Arbitration Institute (2026), pp. 4-18.
[17] Opinion 1/17, EU-Canada CET Agreement, Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion, 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, paras. 205-219.
[18] International Bar Association, Consistency, Efficiency and Transparency in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Chapter 1: Consistency in Investor-State Arbitration, pp. 33-34 (November 2018).
[19] C. Braumann and A. Reinisch, Investment Court Systems, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law (September 2018), para. 11.
[20] Queen Mary University of London and Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group, 2020 QMUL-CCIAG Survey: Investors’ Perceptions of ISDS, p. 8 (May 2020).
[21] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Arts. 31-32.
[22] J. Arato et al., Parsing and Managing Inconsistency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 21 Journal of World Investment & Trade 336 (2020), pp. 336-373.
[23] A. De Luca et al., Responding to Incorrect Decision-Making in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Policy Options, 21 Journal of World Investment & Trade 374 (2020), pp. 374-409; M. Feldman, Investment Arbitration Appellate Mechanism Options: Consistency, Accuracy, and Balance of Power, 32 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 528 (2017), pp. 528-544.
[24] Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union and Its Member States, of the Other Part (CETA), signed 30 October 2016, OJ L 11/23, 14 January 2017, Art. 8.28(2), (5)-(9).
[25] Queen Mary University of London and Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group, 2020 QMUL-CCIAG Survey: Investors’ Perceptions of ISDS (May 2020), pp. 20-21.
[26] World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, stating that the Appellate Body is currently unable to review appeals because of ongoing vacancies and that the term of its last sitting member expired on 30 November 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm.
[27] C. Braumann and A. Reinisch, Investment Court Systems, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law (September 2018), paras. 54-55.
[28] International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Updated Note on a Potential Inter Se Modification of the ICSID Convention (2026); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, signed 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159, Art. 53.
[29] UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, effective 1 April 2014, Arts. 2-7; United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, adopted 10 December 2014, entered into force 18 October 2017.
[30] UNCITRAL and ICSID, Code of Conduct for Arbitrators in International Investment Dispute Resolution and Commentary (February 2024), Arts. 3-9; UNCITRAL and ICSID, Code of Conduct for Judges in International Investment Dispute Resolution and Commentary (October 2024), Arts. 3-9.