The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) has long served as the cornerstone of the multilateral trading system, providing not only a framework for negotiating trade agreements but also a structured mechanism for resolving disputes. Central to the latter function was the WTO’s two-tier dispute settlement system, comprised of panels and the Appellate Body. However, the paralysis of the Appellate Body since 2020 has cast a long shadow over the credibility and enforceability of WTO dispute resolution.
This note examines the collapse of the Appellate Body, the institutional void it has created, and the responses by WTO members seeking to preserve legal certainty and multilateralism in trade governance. In particular, it focuses on how arbitration in the form of the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (“MPIA”) has emerged as a novel solution to circumventing appeals to the inoperative Appellate Body, particularly within the context of the recent release of the MPIA’s second-ever arbitral award in the China – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights case. The note outlines the origins, structure, and function of the MPIA, evaluates its practical application to date and considers the broader implications for the WTO’s future.
Background: Collapse of the WTO Appellate Body
The WTO is an international organisation that deals with the global rules of trade with the goal of promoting economic development and well-being.[1] It was established in 1995 as a result of the signing of the WTO Agreement by 123 states following the “biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed”, known as the Uruguay Rounds.[2] Since then, the WTO has grown to include 166 member states, which account for over 98% of global trade.
The WTO Agreement also includes four annexes, which member states must also adopt in order to join. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the “DSU”), which constitutes Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, established the Dispute Settlement Body (the “DSB”) to administer the WTO’s rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes.[3]
To fulfil this purpose, one of the DSB’s functions is to establish panels to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibility under the DSU and other covered agreements. These panels assist the DSB by making objective assessments of the matters before them. This includes examining the facts of the case, assessing conformity with covered agreements, and making findings that help the DSB in formulating recommendations or rulings.[4]
Within this framework, the Appellate Body, created under Article 17 of the DSU[5], was intended to provide a second level of legal scrutiny by hearing appeals from panel decisions, ensuring consistency and legal soundness in panel findings.[6] The Appellate Body is to be composed of seven persons, appointed by the DSB for a maximum of two four-year terms, with three serving in rotation on any one case.[7]
The DSB must decide on the appointment of Appellate Body members by consensus, meaning that “no Member, present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.”[8] While this consensus-based decision-making process gives each member an equal voice and encourages constructive engagement through negotiation, it also provides an opportunity for members to hold the process hostage according to their own agendas.
This is precisely what has occurred, as, starting in 2016, the United States (under both Democratic and Republican leaders) has blocked the appointment of new members to the Appellate Body.[9] A report published in February 2020 by the United States Trade Representative cited the purported “persistent overreaching” of the Appellate Body as the reason for the United States’ lack of cooperation:[10]
Specifically, the Appellate Body has added to U.S. obligations and diminished U.S. rights by failing to comply with WTO rules, addressing issues it has no authority to address, taking actions it has no authority to take, and interpreting WTO agreements in ways not envisioned by the WTO Members who entered into those agreements. This persistent overreaching is plainly contrary to the Appellate Body’s limited mandate, as set out in WTO rules.
On a more fundamental level, this overreaching also violates the basic principles of the United States Government. There is no legitimacy under our democratic, constitutional system for the nation to submit to a rule imposed by three individuals sitting in Geneva, with neither agreement by the United States nor approval by the United States Congress. The Appellate Body has consistently acted to increase its own authority while decreasing the authority of the United States and other WTO Members, which, unlike the individuals on the Appellate Body, are accountable to the citizens in their countries – citizens whose lives and livelihoods are affected by the WTO’s decisions.
This perspective has underpinned the United States’ persistent refusal to approve new appointments. Since then, the mandates of the remaining members have expired, leaving the Appellate Body entirely vacant. The result has been a complete standstill in the WTO’s appellate function. As stated on the Appellate Body page of the WTO’s website, “Currently, the Appellate Body is unable to review appeals given its ongoing vacancies. The term of the last sitting Appellate Body member expired on 30 November 2020.”[11]
Despite this, WTO members have continued to file appeals, which now accumulate without being heard[12], earning them the name of appeals “into the void”.[13] Ironically, many of these appeals have been filed by the United States, likely to prevent adverse panel decisions from becoming binding.[14]
The inability to resolve these disputes until new Appellate Body members are appointed has resulted in an impasse. Should the appointments eventually proceed, the backlog could overwhelm the Appellate Body, causing even further delays.
The MPIA Explained
In light of the Appellate Body’s paralysis, WTO members were forced to explore alternatives to preserve the integrity of the dispute settlement system, culminating in the establishment of the MPIA.
Arbitration is foreseen “as an alternative means of dispute settlement” in Article 25 of the DSU, subject to the mutual agreement of the parties:[15]
Article 25 (Arbitration)
1. Expeditious arbitration within the WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement can facilitate the solution of certain disputes that concern issues that are clearly defined by both parties.
2. Except as otherwise provided in this Understanding, resort to arbitration shall be subject to mutual agreement of the parties which shall agree on the procedures to be followed. Agreements to resort to arbitration shall be notified to all Members sufficiently in advance of the actual commencement of the arbitration process.
3. Other Members may become party to an arbitration proceeding only upon the agreement of the parties which have agreed to have recourse to arbitration. The parties to the proceeding shall agree to abide by the arbitration award. Arbitration awards shall be notified to the DSB and the Council or Committee of any relevant agreement where any Member may raise any point relating thereto.
4. Articles 21 and 22 of this Understanding shall apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration awards.
However, this provision was rarely used and was not drafted with appeals in mind.[16]
Nevertheless, in a communication dated 30 April 2020, a coalition of 19 WTO members – Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the European Union (the “EU”), Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Singapore, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Uruguay[17] – invoked the largely underutilised Article 25 of the DSU to establish the MPIA.[18] This opt-in, independent appellate mechanism was designed to mirror the role and function of the Appellate Body in the interim.[19]
Membership of the MPIA was left open, and any WTO member can unilaterally join the MPIA at any time, simply by notifying the DSB that it endorses the communication creating the MPIA.[20]
Arbitration Agreement
For the system to function, the MPIA participants agreed to enter into an appellate arbitration agreement within 60 days of the establishment of any WTO dispute panel.[21] The text of the communication establishing the MPIA includes as an annex such an arbitration agreement (“Annex 1”).[22]
Annex 1 provides the “Agreed Procedures for Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU in Dispute DS X” and allows the parties to a dispute to copy the text of Annex 1 and fill it in with the information from their specific case.[23]
Thus, arbitration through the MPIA, like any arbitration, functions based on the consent of the parties.
MPIA Procedure
The procedure of the MPIA is as follows:[24]
References to the WPAR refer to the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, which are incorporated, inter alia, by paragraph 11 of Annex 1.[25] These procedures were drawn up by the Appellate Body for the Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, in accordance with Article 17(9) of the DSU.[26] Thus, the procedures of the MPIA truly do mirror those of the Appellate Body.
Importantly, with regard to the MPIA procedure, Annex 1 provides that “arbitration may only be initiated if the Appellate Body is not able to hear an appeal” in the dispute under Article 16.4 and 17 of the DSU.[27] It then goes on to define such a situation as “where, on the date of issuance of the final panel report to the parties, there are fewer than three Appellate Body members.”[28] This confirms the temporary and subsidiary nature of the MPIA with regard to the appeals process originally foreseen by the DSU.
MPIA Arbitrators
MPIA appeals are heard by arbitrators selected from a pool of 10 arbitrators nominated and voted on by the MPIA participants.[29] According to paragraph 4 of the communication establishing the MPIA, these arbitrators are to have the following characteristics:[30]
- Persons of recognised authority;
- Demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally; and
- Unaffiliated with any government.
Further, paragraph 4 states that the arbitrators will not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest.
The required characteristics of arbitrators are the same as Appellate Body members,[31] but differ from those of the panellists of the first tier of WTO dispute resolution. Contrary to the arbitrators who must be unaffiliated with any government, panellists may be governmental officials, and, while they must be “well-qualified”, this need not have anything to do with experience in international trade law.[32] Like the arbitrators, however, panellists must be independent and serve only in their individual capacities.[33]
The pool was most recently partially recomposed on 28 May 2025 to include the following members (new members in bold):
- Mr Mateo Diego-Fernández ANDRADE (Mexico)
- Mr Ichiro ARAKI (Japan)
- Ms Ana T. CAETANO (Brazil)
- Mr Esteban B. CONEJOS JR. (Philippines)
- Mr Thomas COTTIER (Switzerland)
- Ms Locknie HSU (Singapore) (reappointed)
- Mr Alejandro JARA (Chile)
- Mr Paul Richard O’CONNOR (Australia)
- Mr Joost PAUWELYN (Belgium)
- Mr Guohua YANG (China)
These new members replaced, at random, 5 of the original arbitrators serving in the pool: Ms Locknie HSU (Singapore), Ms Valerie HUGHES (Canada), Mr José Alfredo Graça LIMA (Brazil), Ms Claudia OROZCO (Colombia) and Dr Penelope RIDINGS (New Zealand).[34]
MPIA arbitrators are paid out of the WTO budget, a fact which the United States has vocally protested.[35]
MPIA Awards
After a Tribunal composed from the pool of arbitrators has heard the case, it will render an award, including recommendations on how the party concerned can bring its relevant trade measures into conformity with the relevant agreement.[36] Awards must be rendered in English, French, and Spanish and are immediately binding upon issuance, despite the requirement that the award be notified to the DSB.[37] This differs from Appellate Body reports, which had to be adopted by the DSB before becoming binding.[38]
Further, appeals are limited to issues of law covered by the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel, and arbitrators must only address in their awards those issues that are necessary for the resolution of the dispute and that have been raised by the parties.[39] Any parts of the panel’s findings that have not been appealed also become an integral part of the award, according to Annex 1, para. 9.[40] These constraints placed on MPIA arbitrators build on the restrictions placed on the Appellate body in DSU Article 17(6), which states only that an appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel,[41] and, theoretically, work to limit any potential overreach of the MPIA, in line with the United States’ concerns about the Appellate Body.
According to Article 25(4) of the DSU, the implementation and enforcement provisions of Articles 21 and 22 apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration awards.[42] Article 21 requires prompt compliance with the award and sets out procedures for surveillance of its implementation.[43] Article 22 provides for compensation and the suspension of concessions in the event that the award is not implemented within a reasonable period of time.[44]
Thus, while the awards issued by MPIA arbitrators largely mirror the reports produced by the Appellate Body, the MPIA includes some important innovations that enhance the legitimacy of the process.
Case Studies: The First Two MPIA Awards
Colombia — Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands
The Colombia — Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands case (the “EU-Colombia Dispute”) was the first ever MPIA arbitral award.[45]
In this case, the EU initiated consultations in November 2019, alleging that Colombia’s anti-dumping investigation and resulting duties breached the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Customs Valuation Agreement, and the GATT 1994.[46] After consultations failed, a WTO panel was requested in February 2020 and formally established by June 2020.[47]
On 13 July 2020, Colombia and the EU notified the DSB of their mutual agreement to enter into arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to decide any appeal from any final panel report issued to the parties in the dispute.[48] This was in accordance with their commitment (mentioned above) to enter into an arbitration agreement within 60 days of the establishment of a panel.[49]
In August 2022, the Panel issued its final report to the parties, finding that Colombia’s Ministry of Trade (“MINCIT”) had acted inconsistently with WTO rules across multiple procedural and substantive areas:[50]
- Initiation of Investigation: Colombia failed to properly assess whether using third-country sales prices (e.g., to the UK) to determine normal value was appropriate at the time of initiating the investigation.
- Confidential Treatment: MINCIT granted confidential status to redacted information in the domestic industry’s application without showing good cause, and failed to require adequate non-confidential summaries.
- Misuse of Facts Available: Colombia improperly disregarded exporters’ actual data and used customs database figures instead, which distorted dumping margin calculations.
- Denial of Fair Adjustments: Requests from exporters for adjustments related to product mix, packaging, and oil costs were unjustifiably denied, undermining the fairness of the comparison between export price and normal value.
- Injury and Causation Errors: MINCIT improperly included imports from exporters with de minimis or negative dumping margins in its injury and causation analysis.
The Panel recommended that Colombia bring its measures into conformity with WTO obligations.[51]
In October 2022, Colombia notified the DSB of its decision to initiate arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU through a Notification of Appeal.[52] The three arbitrators appointed, Alejandro Jara and Joost Pauwelyn, with José Alfredo Graça Lima as the Chairperson, reviewed Colombia’s legal appeals against the Panel’s findings.[53]
The hearing was held on 15 November 2022 at the premises of the WTO and was attended by the parties and six third parties (Brazil, China, Japan, Russia, Turkey and the United States).[54]
On 19 December 2022, the arbitrators issued their award, the first ever MPIA award, deciding partially in favour of Colombia:
- Initiation Stage Examination of Normal Value: The arbitrators reversed the panel’s finding on third-country sales prices. They found that MINCIT had adequately assessed the appropriateness of such prices when launching the investigation, and the Panel had applied too strict a standard.[55]
However, the Tribunal upheld the rest of the panel’s findings:
- Confidentiality: The arbitrators agreed with the panel that Colombia improperly granted confidential treatment without sufficient justification.[56]
- Packaging Adjustment: The EU’s claim on packaging costs was rightly considered within the Panel’s terms of reference.[57]
- Injury Analysis: The Panel correctly found that imports with negligible dumping margins should not have been included in injury and causation analyses.[58]
China – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
Recently, on 21 July 2025, the WTO circulated the second-ever MPIA arbitration award in the China – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights case (the “EU-China Dispute”) involving the EU and China.
In this case, a WTO panel was established in January 2023 to consider a complaint by the EU, challenging a series of Chinese judicial measures related to anti-suit injunctions (“ASIs”) issued in the context of standard essential patent (“SEP”) litigation.[59] The EU alleged that these measures breached several provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, particularly those protecting patent rights and transparency.[60]
In July 2023, China and the EU notified the DSB of their mutual agreement to resort to MPIA arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU to decide any appeal from the final panel report.[61] While this was longer than 60 days after the establishment of the panel, as required by paragraph 10 of the communication establishing the MPIA,[62] it nonetheless demonstrated the parties’ commitment to the alternative appellate mechanism.
In February 2025, the Panel issued its report to the parties, with the following findings:[63]
- Existence of ASI Policy: The Panel found that China maintained an unwritten ASI policy amounting to a rule or norm of general and prospective application, substantiated by judicial practice and official promotion.
- TRIPS Substantive Provisions (Articles 28 and 44): The EU did not succeed in demonstrating that China’s ASI policy or the individual ASI decisions were inconsistent with the patent rights or enforcement obligations under Article 1.1 read in conjunction with Articles 28.1, 28.2, or 44.1 of TRIPS.
- Individual ASI Decisions: The Panel declined to make separate findings on the five specific ASI decisions under the same TRIPS provisions, considering them duplicative and not necessary to resolve the dispute.
- Transparency under Article 63.1: The Panel ruled that China breached its obligation to publish a significant decision (Xiaomi v. InterDigital) that was considered to be of general application, thus violating Article 63.1 of TRIPS. However, the panel considered that the decisions issuing ASIs in ZTE v. Conversant and OPPO v. Sharp were not of general application and were outside the scope of the publication obligation.
Following the Panel’s report, both parties filed appeals.[64] Claudia Orozco, Mateo Diego-Fernández Andrade and Penelope Ridings (Chairperson) were appointed as arbitrators in the case and heard the appeal on 4-5 June 2025, with attendance from multiple third parties including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.[65]
On 21 July 2025, the arbitrators issued their award, ruling in favour of the European Union on key points:
- ASI Policy as a Rule or Norm: The arbitrators upheld the finding that the EU had provided sufficient evidence and argumentation to demonstrate the existence of the ASI policy as a rule or norm of general and prospective application.[66]
- TRIPS Article 1.1 and the Frustration of Rights: The arbitrators reversed the Panel’s interpretation, holding that Article 1.1 implies a duty not to frustrate the functioning of IP systems in other WTO Members.[67]
- Patent Rights (Articles 28.1 and 28.2): The ASI policy was found to interfere with the rights of SEP holders by preventing them from enforcing patents or negotiating licences on FRAND terms in foreign jurisdictions. The policy was therefore inconsistent with Articles 28.1 and 28.2 of the TRIPS Agreement when read with Article 1.1.[68]
- General Application (Article 63.1): The arbitrators upheld the panel’s finding that the decision issuing an ASI in Xiaomi v. InterDigital was a judicial decision “of general application” within the meaning of Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.[69]
However, the arbitrators upheld several of the Panel’s findings in favour of China:
- TRIPS Article 44.1: They upheld the panel’s finding that China’s ASI policy or the individual ASI decisions were not inconsistent with Article 44.1, although for a different reason, that while ASIs might disincentivise legal action abroad, they do not impair the authority of foreign courts to issue injunctions.[70]
- Article 41.1 (Enforcement Procedures): The ASI policy was not considered an “enforcement procedure” and thus fell outside the scope of Article 41.1.[71]
The arbitrators recommended that China bring its ASI policy into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement, aligning its domestic judicial practice with multilateral obligations.[72]
The Present and Future MPIA
With regard to the EU-Colombia Dispute, while Colombia claims to have implemented the findings of the panel’s report and the arbitral award through a ministerial resolution issued on 21 November 2023, the EU considered that Colombia’s actions have not been sufficient.[73] Only time will tell how effective the implementation of the EU-China Dispute award will be. Nonetheless, the issuance of these two MPIA arbitral awards is a positive sign for the future of WTO appeals.
Certain commentators initially voiced concerns that MPIA parties would not respect the requirement that an arbitration agreement be filed within 60 days of panel establishment.[74] While not all parties have strictly adhered to the 60-day window, as illustrated by the EU–China dispute, where the arbitration agreement was filed after the deadline, they have ultimately followed through in concluding such agreements and submitting to binding arbitration. As demonstrated by the two completed arbitrations, along with other cases where agreements have been filed in practice (though they have not yet progressed to arbitration),[75] this has not posed a systemic problem; the parties appear committed to maintaining a functioning WTO dispute resolution system.[76]
Despite minor delays in some instances, the MPIA has enabled participating Members to seek a binding appeal of panel decisions, as intended. This represents a key success for the MPIA framework as an interim safeguard against the US-created Appellate Body “void”.
However, this perceived success of the MPIA reaches only as far as the MPIA participants. Therefore, while major economic players like the EU and China have recourse to arbitration in disputes with other MPIA participants, others like the United States and India still question the MPIA’s legitimacy.
Further, even for MPIA participants, in disputes where at least one of the parties did not accept the MPIA, there is still a void unless the non-participant agrees to ad hoc arbitration.[77]
Looking Ahead
When considering the future of the MPIA, it may be important to consider what motivates WTO members to participate in the arrangement.
A 2024 report by Krzysztof Pelc, the Lester B. Pearson Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, found that a WTO member’s decision to participate in the MPIA depends largely on a cost-benefit analysis: specifically, whether the member expects to bring more trade disputes against others than it expects to have brought against itself.[78] Additionally, participation is influenced by whether the member’s main trading partners are also part of the MPIA. [79] This is because appeals between MPIA members are more effective and carry real consequences, unlike appeals outside the MPIA, which may be left unresolved due to the current paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body.[80]
This calculus may explain the United States’ continued opposition to the MPIA since its creation, claiming that it “seeks to clothe itself with faux Appellate Body authority while impinging on the rights of non-participating Members”.[81] Its opposition to the MPIA allows the United States to comfortably send any unflattering panel decisions into the void, indefinitely postponing any accountability for improper trade measures.[82]
In the meantime, efforts have been made to reform the Appellate Body, but there has been little progress.[83] For example, on 26 January 2024, Guatemala submitted a proposal on behalf of 130 WTO members to launch the selection process for Appellate Body members, but it was again blocked by the United States, for the 73rd time.[84]
This continued American hostility, along with the fact that any WTO member can join the MPIA at any time and that the MPIA’s pool of arbitrators is selected by consensus among its participant members,[85] begs the question of whether the United States could hypothetically join the MPIA not to engage in good faith, but rather to obstruct its function from within.
Nevertheless, the MPIA’s membership continues to grow, and Pelc’s study suggests that it could continue to do so. With the United Kingdom’s accession to the MPIA on 25 June 2025, the arrangement now encompasses 57 WTO members.[86] Pelc has found that over time, economic cooperation between MPIA participants has increased, as has the pressure on non-members to join.[87] This trend indicates that the MPIA could play an increasingly important role within the WTO framework, encouraging wider participation through both practical utility and deepening economic ties among its members.
Conclusion
For the time being, the MPIA remains a temporary workaround rather than a full-fledged replacement for the WTO’s appellate mechanism. The broader and more durable solution lies in reviving or reforming the Appellate Body – a prospect that remains politically contentious, given the United States’ continued and unwavering opposition.
Until such a resolution is achieved, MPIA arbitration offers a functioning appeal mechanism within the WTO framework for a significant subset of its membership. It provides a degree of legal certainty and continuity in the multilateral trading system. As a creative, rules-based response to institutional paralysis, the MPIA restores confidence in the dispute settlement process, albeit only among those members who remain committed to the WTO’s normative framework.
[1] WTO, What is the World Trade Organization?, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[2] WTO, The Uruguay Round, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[3] Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), Article 2 (Administration).
[4] DSU, Article 11 (Function of Panels).
[5] WTO, Appellate Body, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[6] DSU, Article 17 (Appellate Review).
[7] DSU, Article 17(1) (Appellate Review).
[8] DSU, fn 1.
[9] Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), 2025, https://wtoplurilaterals.info/plural_initiative/the-mpia/ (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[10] United States Trade Representative Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, February 2020, p. 3 of the PDF.
[11] WTO, Appellate Body, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[12] Ibid.
[13] WTO, WTO reform – an overview, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc12_e/briefing_notes_e/bfwtoreform_e.htm (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[14] WTO, Appellate Body, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (last accessed 24 July 2025); K. Pelc, Institutional Innovation in Response to Backlash: How Members Are Circumventing the WTO Impasse, 2024 Rev. of Intl. Organizations, p. 6.
[15] DSU, Article 25 (Arbitration).
[16] K. Pelc, Institutional Innovation in Response to Backlash: How Members Are Circumventing the WTO Impasse, 2024 Rev. of Intl. Organizations, p. 7.
[17] European Commission, Interim appeal arrangement for WTO disputes becomes effective, 30 April 2020, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/interim-appeal-arrangement-wto-disputes-becomes-effective-2020-04-30_en (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[18] Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes [2020] JOB/DSB/1/Add.12.
[19] K. Pelc, Institutional Innovation in Response to Backlash: How Members Are Circumventing the WTO Impasse, 2024 Rev. of Intl. Organizations, p. 1.
[20] Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes [2020] JOB/DSB/1/Add.12, para. 12.
[21] Ibid., para. 10.
[22] Ibid., Annex 1.
[23] Ibid., Annex 1, para. 1.
[24] J. Pauwelyn, The MPIA: What’s New (Part II), 27 February 2023, https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2023/02/the-mpia-whats-new-part-ii.html (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[25] Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes [2020] JOB/DSB/1/Add.12, Annex 1, para. 11.
[26] DSU, Article 17(9) (Appellate Review).
[27] Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes [2020] JOB/DSB/1/Add.12, Annex 1, para. 2.
[28] Ibid., Annex 1, para. 2.
[29] Ibid., Annex 2.
[30] Ibid., para. 4.
[31] DSU, Article 17(3) (Appellate Review).
[32] DSU, Article 8(1) (Composition of Panels).
[33] DSU, Article 8(9) (Composition of Panels)
[34] Statement on a Mechanism For Developing, Documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes (Supplement) [2025] JOB/DSB/1/Add.12/Suppl.14; Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), 2025, https://wtoplurilaterals.info/plural_initiative/the-mpia/ (last accessed 24 July 2025); S. Lester, MPIA Update: A New Party Joins and Four New Arbitrators are Appointed, 3 June 2025, https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2025/06/mpia-update-a-new-party-jons-and-four-new-arbitrators-are-appointed.html (last accessed 25 July 2025).
[35] K. Pelc, Institutional Innovation in Response to Backlash: How Members Are Circumventing the WTO Impasse, 2024 Rev. of Intl. Organizations, p. 9.
[36] Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes [2020] JOB/DSB/1/Add.12, Annex 1, para. 9; DSU, Article 19 (Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations).
[37] J. Pauwelyn, The MPIA: What’s New (Part II), 27 February 2023, https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2023/02/the-mpia-whats-new-part-ii.html (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[38] DSU, Article 17(14) (Adoption of Appellate Body Reports).
[39] Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes [2020] JOB/DSB/1/Add.12, Annex 1, paras. 9-10.
[40] DSU, Article 25(4) (Arbitration).
[41] DSU, Article 17(6) (Appellate Review) (Standing Appellate Body).
[42] DSU, Article 25(4) (Arbitration).
[43] DSU, Article 21 (Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings).
[44] DSU, Article 22 (Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions).
[45] Colombia — Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, WT/DS591/ARB25, Award, 21 December 2022.
[46] Colombia — Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, WT/DS591/7, Notification of Appeal, 10 October 2022, para. 1.1.
[47] Ibid., para. 1.3.
[48] Colombia — Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, WT/DS591/3, Agreed Procedures for Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU, 15 July 2020.
[49] Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes [2020] JOB/DSB/1/Add.12, para.10.
[50] Colombia — Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, WT/DS591/ARB25, Award, 21 December 2022, paras 1.4-1.5.
[51] Colombia — Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, WT/DS591/ARB25, Award, 21 December 2022, para. 1.6.
[52] Colombia — Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, WT/DS591/7, Notification of Appeal, 10 October 2022.
[53] Colombia — Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, WT/DS591/ARB25, Award, 21 December 2022, para. 1.8.
[54] Ibid., para. 1.12.
[55] Ibid., para. 4.31.
[56] Ibid., para. 4.48.
[57] Ibid., para. 4.71.
[58] Ibid., para. 4.102.
[59] China – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS611/ARB25, Award, 21 July 2025, para. 1.2.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid., para. 1.3.
[62] Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes [2020] JOB/DSB/1/Add.12, para. 12.
[63] China – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS611/ARB25, Award, 21 July 2025, para. 1.6.
[64] Ibid., paras. 1.8-1.9.
[65] Ibid., para. 1.15.
[66] Ibid., para. 5.1(a).
[67] Ibid., para. 5.1(b).
[68] Ibid., para. 5.1(c) and (d).
[69] Ibid., para. 5.1(g).
[70] Ibid., para. 5.1(e).
[71] Ibid., para. 5.1(f).
[72] Ibid., para. 5.2.
[73] EU Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, EU takes further action in Colombia frozen fries dispute, 14 November 2024, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-takes-further-action-colombia-frozen-fries-dispute-2024-11-14_en (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[74] J. Pauwelyn, The MPIA: What’s New (Part II), 27 February 2023, https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2023/02/the-mpia-whats-new-part-ii.html (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[75] For example: DS610 China – Alleged Chinese restrictions on the import and export of goods, and the supply of services, to and from Lithuania and DS611 China – Enforcement of intellectual property rights.
[76] J. Pauwelyn, The MPIA: What’s New (Part II), 27 February 2023, https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2023/02/the-mpia-whats-new-part-ii.html (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[77] DS583 Turkey – Certain Measures concerning the Production, Importation and Marketing of Pharmaceutical Products.
[78] K. Pelc, Institutional Innovation in Response to Backlash: How Members Are Circumventing the WTO Impasse, 2024 Rev. of Intl. Organizations, pp. 11-13.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Letter from Dennis C. Shea to the WTO Director General, 5 June 2020 (cited in K. Pelc, Institutional Innovation in Response to Backlash: How Members Are Circumventing the WTO Impasse, 2024 Rev. of Intl. Organizations, p. 9).
[82] K. Pelc, Institutional Innovation in Response to Backlash: How Members Are Circumventing the WTO Impasse, 2024 Rev. of Intl. Organizations, p. 6.
[83] WTO, WTO reform – an overview, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc12_e/briefing_notes_e/bfwtoreform_e.htm (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[84] Krzysztof Pecl, Have WTO Members Successfully Circumvented the US’ Blockade of the Appellate Body? (and How Would We Know?), 13 February 2024, https://www.ejiltalk.org/have-wto-members-successfully-circumvented-the-us-blockade-of-the-appellate-body-and-how-would-we-know/#_ftn1 (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[85] Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes [2020] JOB/DSB/1/Add.12, Annex 2, para. 4.
[86] Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), 2025, https://wtoplurilaterals.info/plural_initiative/the-mpia/ (last accessed 24 July 2025); EU Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, Multilateral trading order strengthened as UK joins interim appeals system, 26 June 2025, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/multilateral-trading-order-strengthened-uk-joins-interim-appeals-system-2025-06-26_en (last accessed 24 July 2025).
[87] K. Pelc, Institutional Innovation in Response to Backlash: How Members Are Circumventing the WTO Impasse, 2024 Rev. of Intl. Organizations, p. 25.